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To be honest with you my knowledge of mining either on 
the land or in the ocean is meager. The mining operation with 
which I am more familiar is not that of discovering an existing 
gold mine, but, rather, the creation of a new one; for example, 
the "gold mine" the aircraft industry created in California . .  
In order to have a better appreciation o f  the policy 
issues involved in ocean mining it is necessary to understand the 
payoff of such activity from the standpoint of society as a 
whole. First, granting that there are potato-sized objects on 
the ocean floor containing manganese, iron, nickel, cobalt, and 
so forth, I am unclear about the benefits of ocean mining for 
mankind. Is the world.now facing a shortage of these materials; 
that is, is their real price rapidly rising? Or, if their price 
is not rapidly rising now, will it be in the future? Or, is there 
no economic shortage of these materials? Is the main uncertainty 
about future supplies a political uncertaint� rather than an 
economic uncertainty? Second, what economic gains will be achieved 
in mining the ocean floor? What will the metals taken from the 
ocean floor cost in comparison with current or prospective costs? 
I know there is a great deal of uncertainty attached to cost 
estimates of new activities. In fact, based on previous research, 
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I doubt if the costs in question can be estimated within la 
factor of five or ten -- with the difference between the 
and lowest costs depending, in part, upon luck and, in part!, on 
cleverness of entrepreneurs during design and developmenJ. ' 
Assuming that such a range of uncertainty does exist, onl tring 
important to know is this: if one or more of the groups 
that now believe ocean mining is a paying proposition, to ' 
h · · b d · d . extent are t eir expectations ase on conservative esign 
to what extent on cleverness in minimizing cost? Or, to pu 
point in another way, are we looking at estimates made by 
comfortable monopolists who do not feel hard-pressed to Javi 
money; or estimates made by eager monopolists who becausl o  
pressures from operating within a consortium are rtonetheles 
highly risk averse; or estimates made by highly enterprilin' 
competitors who must take risks because their survival il alt 
stake? 
Granting a wide range exists in the cost of processes 
for both ocean floor vacuum cleaning and separating matelia�s 
from nodules, how important is it to minimize the cost of these 
activities? Assuming costs can vary by a factor of five lorl ten, 
how important is it to approach the bottom of that range? I 
Obviously its importance depends upon the elasticity of demand I 
for these metals. Perhaps, as has already been suggested, �he 
elasticity of demand for copper is so high that only a flw cents 
difference in price would make a great deal of differencl ih the I 
quantity demanded. To provide another kind of example, if �he 
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difference between minimum cost energy and maximum cost energy 
were a difference between energy costs going up three or five 
times, we would certainly want to know: with the incentives 
provided today can it be assumed that energy costs are being 
minimized? 
Now to be more specific, let us assume that mining 
oceans would provide a commercial advantage for the consortiums 
so engaged. Profits would not only cover costs, but would also 
recognize the degree of risk involved. However, let us also 
assume just for the sake of the argument that we are talking 
about a case of very low demand elasticity. In other words, 
the firms engaged in mining operations are made better off than 
they otherwise would be, but as far as consumers are concerned 
there is a rather negligible difference. Under this assumption 
what should government policy be? Beyond assuring that no damage 
is done to the ocean environment, no strong case can be made for 
public action. To· be sure, if my understanding is correct, some 
companies might still refuse to go ahead, because they cannot 
insure themselves against the possibility of loss of property 
rights. But neither can American firms operating in foreign 
countries obtain insurance that will protect their property 
rights. And it is by no means clear why in ocean mining 
insurance should be provided, and why in other cases it should 
not be. 
Next, let us turn to the more interesting case in which 
it is important to minimize costs. Let us assume that there are 
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important potential benefits not only for the firms involve� but I 
for the public at large. Let us assume that it is possible' Ito 
obtain significant cost reductions that would be importanl fbr 
the future development of the economy. Under this assumpbi 
would be disturbed that, while there is a hidden hand at lo 
I 
in ocean mining, there appears to be an acute need for a �idi:len 
foot. What is the difference between a hidden hand and alh" 
foot? The hidden hand argument is Adam Smith's. And it st 
that in making profits as large as possible the butcher, bh 
baker, and the candlestick maker are not only serving thelr 
interests, but the interests of the public at large. To �e. [sure, 
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there are often risks involved in making profits as large[ as 
possible, but bringing in the element of technological risk [into I 
the equation does not change the essential character of Ad 
Smith's argument. The central problem with Adam Smith's 
definition of self-interest is that it is not broad enougfu. I A 
firm does not only have to take into account technological 
but the risk of what rivals might do to its share of the lai:lket 
It is this secln 
that is the hidden foot risk. Moreover, it should be applr 
that the larger risk your rival takes, the larger risk thlt lit 
if it develops maximum cost alternatives. risl• 
t 
will pay for you to take if you value your survival. ThJ, lit 
certainly pays to take larger risks in, say, the chemical 
industry than in the steel industry. 
I hasten to add, however, that Adam Smith really .nnoti 
be blamed for having defined self-interest so narrowly as I to: 
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leave the hidden foot out of account. In 1776 when he wrote The 
Wealth of Nations, competition and ideas mainly took the form of 
ill-organized competition between inventors rather than well-
organized competition between firms. And not until 1850 was 
there highly organized forms of technological competition. How-
ever, on the basis of what I know today it is my conviction that 
the push of the hidden foot plays a more important role in the 
making of significant advances than the pull of the hidden hand. 
To be sure, wide differences can be observed among individuals 
with respect to their willingness to engage in risk-taking --
from risk lovers to risk haters. But business firms seldom, if 
ever, take risks simply because they are headed by the hero 
entrepreneurs we read about in storybooks. For example, when 
Henry Ford developed the Model T, Ford's share of the automobile 
market was only ten percent -- no larger than a dozen or so firms 
that had already gone out of �usiness. If he wanted to compete 
against rugged Buicks selling for $1,000 and inexpensive runabouts 
selling for $400, he had no other alternative but to take the 
risk in making a car that was quite as rugged as the Buick but 
would sell for no more than $600. In other words, it was not the 
hidden hand that was pulling Henry Ford; it was the hidden foot 
that was pushing him. Indeed, in many significant advances the 
push of the hidden foot has really been the primary reason why 
firms take risks. 
Now that we have introduced rivalry into our model, 
let us be more clear about the role of rivalry in reducing costs. 
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Let us assume that we are talking about a subjective probab�lity 
distribution with respect to the cost of an operation (sel Jigurel I) . While the firm may have a fair idea of the distributlo , II beforehand it does not know just where on the curve partihu ar 
hypothesis will lie. So what does it do? Suppose the film lis 
content with a hypothesis that falls in the middle of the 
distribution (A on Figure I). If it sets A as its limit to'st 
it merely has to search until it finds a satisfactory altlrrlative 
This is the likely search strategy of a firm which is notl ptlshed 
to operate within a tight cost constraint. Next, supposelttle 
cost limit is set at B. The firm will be provided with an 
incentive not only to search more widely, but to ask morelarld 
pointed questions. Quite obviously, the more pointed quest�ons 
I entrepreneurs can ask, the more they can reduce search cost 
Finally, assume the limit is set at C. This provides entbe 
with an incentive to extend the probability distribution.  
The key point is this: the greater the change in, mark 
shares likely to result from significant discoveries (i. e l, lthe 
more effective the hidden foot), the greater the likelihold bf 
extending the probability distribution. 
Of course, the entrepreneur cannot know beforehand! the 
probability of extending the distribution. Indeed, it is1very 
important not to try to attach probability estimates bef oie makin I 
guesses about new hypotheses, because by attaching probabili�y 
estimates to your hypothesis, many relevant hints will noj b 
taken into account. This new probability distribution is lre�lly 
>. ..... 
FIGURE I
Operation X: Probability Distributions
of Hypotheses with Respect to Cost
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an ex post probability distribution. To return for a mintitel to I 
the Model T, when it was first introduced it cost $950 and its 
sales were disappointing. Consequently a $600 target pride was  
set. After that an employee of the Ford Motor Company in,orlned 
Henry Ford that he had visited a meat packing plant and had 'seen 
the disassembling of carcasses with overhead production 11ne 
and questioned why it would not be possible to reverse thlt 
process for assembling cars. That was just a hint, and nl ohe I 
could calculate the probability of its leading to a significant 
reduction in costs. What Ford did was try out the idea wJer 
its application would be most obvious. Not until this waJ 
accomplished was the probability distribution extended. 
In order to generate new probability distributions,! an. I organization like a criminal law firm is required. But the,kind 
of organizations that you have in these more mature technllo
more resemble probate law firms -- if you ever asked a prlba�e I 
law firm to try a criminal law case it could not do it. Andi no 
more than a probate law firm can try a criminal law case, l c 
you take a highly structured organization that is set up iori 
specialized tasks and get it to develop a new kind of tec,nqlogy. 
The essential difference between an organization which acts Ion 
the basis of given probability distributions and one thatlgenera 
new distributions is that the latter must be more interacti�e -­
so int.eractive that the authorship of particular inventiols. lis 
always in doubt. A highly interactive organization is onl which I 
encourages many lucky discoveries. On the other hand, a highly 
structured organization is one in which outcomes depend tl a lar 
extent on luck and luck alone. 
To be sure, when existing firms go into the business of 
ocean mining separate divisions will probably be set up for that 
purpose. But, in all of the cases about which I am familiar, the 
parent organization seldom gives the new division a great deal 
of autonomy. For example, when a highly productive firm is 
acquired by merger, the parent organization invariably provides 
so many constraints that the acquired organization can no longer 
remain innovative. Moreover, in the case of ocean mining we 
must consider not only the constraints imposed by the parent 
company, but also those imposed by other firms belonging to the 
corsortium; and those imposed by various regulatory agencies. 
Moreover, to return to my main argument, it is 
impossible to imagine a firm remaining dynamically efficient if 
it does not face genuine competitive threats. People who have 
worked at Bell Telephone Laboratories will tell you that the 
much greater degree of dynamism that BTL demonstrated after World 
War II, as compared with its performance in earlier periods, was 
the result of its facing real threats to its monopoly position: 
private microwave stations, underseas telephone cables owned by 
other companies, and connnunications satellites owned by others. 
And, if a real hidden foot was required in the case of Bell 
Laboratories, how can we expect dynamic efficiency without a 
hidden foot in the case of ocean mining? 
If new ocean mining firms would have the same advantage 
in this industry as new firms have had in other industries -- an 
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advantage in dynamic efficiency -- why have not independent 
firms entered this field? One possible explanation has Jee 
already alluded to -- the payoff for being clever might jot 
nearly as great as it is in industries such as semicondudtors. 
A second reason newly formed firms have not entered the dcean 
mining business is simply the difficulty of obtaining riJk 
capital. Finding something like a billion dollars for tJi�
of venture certainly would not be easy. As compared witj o 
new 
be 
kind 
industries, the cost of entry is no doubt very high. 
What, then, should the government do to encourage 
competition? If I were really convinced that minimizing Ith 
her 
costs of these mining operations was important, I would lec�mme 
that the government should share the risk with newly f ounde 
firms. For example, the government might provide the sh:i,� 'and 
the firms in question, the vacuum cleaner. But I would jot llike 
to see the government paying the entire cost of developmelt 
baoa�a if <ha gnvar��< did <ha< i< �uld inaura <ha nJL fi�a against failure. What should be done is that firms should �e 
placed in a sufficiently desperate position that they will ao 
all they can to insure themselves against failure. Secon�ly, I 
really wonder whether it is a good idea to give any firms[, new 
or old, permanent property rights, so to speak, for mining 
specific part of the ocean floor. Perhaps the property r�glits 
should remain vested in governments. And perhaps on the basis o 
· · d 1 h 1 · h . 
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competition to eve op t e owest cost equipment, t e winni�g 
firm should be given a contract of limited duration to mile some 
part of the ocean floor and, of course, royalities on its 
equipment to the extent used by other firms. This idea came to 
me when thinking about the railroads. Suppose the government 
had owned the right-of-ways and kept them in good repair, and 
suppose that the government then leased the lines on the basis 
of competitive bids. Is it not likely that the second approach 
would have provided the railroads with a far greater degree of 
dynamic efficiency? The rate of diffusion of innovations in the 
railroad industry has been slower than that of even the coal 
mining industry and the steel industry. Is it not conceivable 
that if the government had leased the lines progress would have 
been more rapid? But what the government did instead was to 
regulate the railroads in a way so as to protect their right to 
be a cartel. To be sure, this was done under the guise of 
protecting the public interest. But inasmuch as regulatory 
agencies prefer an environment with little uncertainty -- because 
such an environment provides a way to minimize bureaucratic risk 
regulation cannot protect the common interest. Only competition 
can do that. 
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Of course, people will say that in the case of ocean 
mining regulation will somehow produce entirely different results. 
But I do not believe it. When firms are not able to engage in 
risk-taking, they either manage to set up an implicit or ·explicit 
cartel or, failing that, they become regulated by the government. 
The only way to insure against that kind of failure is to assure 
that the industry in question is characterized by a good deal of 
rivalry. 
